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Research Article

The Effect of Disclosure Quality on Shareholder Behavior with Emphasis on the Biological Characteristics of the Reporting Unit

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Abstract
This study seeks to explain the effect of quality of financial information disclosure on shareholder behavior with emphasis on biological characteristics (life cycle and reputation) of the reporting unit. Given the content of information in financial statements, it is expected that increasing the quality of financial statements disclosure will affect shareholder decisions. Given that the reporting units in the introduction and growth phase of the life cycle try to gain market reputation by gaining a good reputation, take more appropriate measures to increase the quality of disclosure. The sample of the present study is the active companies of Tehran Stock Exchange including the period of 1390 to 1397. The reason for the limitation in sample selection was due to the way in which the shareholder behavior variable was measured. The results show that the quality of disclosure and the long life of the reporting unit (RU) affect the behavior of shareholders and increase the liquidity of its shares. But shareholder behavior is not affected by a good reputation. Based on the research results, reporting units can put quality information on their agenda to increase the efficiency of the capital market in Iran.
Keyword: Disclosure Quality, Shareholders Behavior, Life Cycle, Reputation, Biological Characteristics.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the quality of accounting information disclosure on shareholder behavior. The importance of the present study is tied to the quality of financial reporting. Because accounting information has informational content (Bozorg Asl, 2015). Therefor the role of information in decision making is undeniable. Because the basis of the decision is to obtain information related to the subject (Azadi and Mirzaei, 2013). Therefore, providing quality information needs plays an essential role in rational decision making. There are several sources of information to get the information you need. For rational decision making, information that is obtained from reliable sources and is a function of qualitative characteristics including

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reliability, relevance, comprehensibility and comparability are considered useful. Today, with the advancement of technology and relying on the concepts proposed in the theories of capital market efficiency, the conflict of interests arising from the theory of representation that leads to information asymmetry and the existence of different evaluation procedures, disclosure of quality information is of great importance. Therefore, the quality of reports is in the center of attention. The importance and role of information in the decision-making process is such that Concept Statement No. 1 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defines the purpose of financial reporting as providing useful information to users. The role of providing quality information became even more prominent with the onset of the financial crisis and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The law also prompted managers to consider the importance of disclosing quality financial information as verified by an independent auditor (Alwardat, 2019). Adherence to the standards of financial reporting quality in units that have a better reputation and a longer history of activity (in the stages of growth and maturity of the life cycle) is expected to motivate the use of these standards. To other reporting units, as a long-term consequence, this improves the quality of financial reporting in reporting units. The importance of this in line with the results of Alwardat (2019) research shows that providing quality information in a timely manner leads to a uniform distribution of information and reduces information asymmetry. So that ethical risks, increasing transaction costs, reducing the efficiency of the capital market and as a result market weakness, low liquidity of stocks, etc. are the consequences of reducing information asymmetry (Pirayesh and Mozaffari, 2018). However, the quality level of financial reporting is optional and there is no mandatory method for applying the quality level of financial reporting. Therefore, considering the importance of the quality of financial statements, this study seeks to evaluate the impact of the quality of financial statements disclosure (basic financial statements and explanatory notes as an integral part of basic financial statements) on shareholder behavior with respect to the impact of life cycle and good reputation is the reporting unit. Given that the stock market is one of the markets that has recently been considered by investors and has a high potential for growth and attraction of investors and also includes a wide range of investors, focusing on it can lead to increased revenue and Wealth of investors. Introducing the present research community, shareholders are individuals who have actually and potentially moved out of the safe margin of investment and moved towards investing in the stock market. Therefore, the target population of the present study is shareholders and stock market activists. The time domain of the present study is related to the years 2011 to 2018. The reason for choosing this time period was the injection of fresh blood into the market vessels and how the variables work. However, the existence of a restriction on the performance of the variable behavior of shareholders has led to a restriction and the selection of the period leading up to 1397. In expressing the innovation of the present study, it should be acknowledged that in the researches, the quality of disclosure from the perspective of shareholders is not considered as the main audience of financial reports and financial reporting with emphasis on the role of normative theories and according to the framework of the FASB (Ghodarzi and Babazadeh Shirvan, 2016). In the present study, the role of financial reporting quality with respect to shareholder behavior can examine the success of existing frameworks.

Literatures Review

The twentieth century is known for two important titles in accounting. Century of Financial Regulation and Century of Certified Public Accountants. The goal of regulation in the United States has been to create uniformity; Disclosure emerged in the UK with an emphasis on information disclosure. Thus, the history of financial information disclosure can be traced back to the twentieth century. Other factors that led to the development of legislation in the UK to achieve this goal include the emergence of factors such as the establishment of legal reporting units and the separation of ownership from management, limited liability of capital owners, the need to register legal reporting units and consequently There is a need to disclose information to owners of capital (History of Accounting site). Disclosure of financial information (DFI) is one of the basic pillars in the scope of tasks in the field of accounting, according to which the audience of disclosure can make the right decision to allocate resources for profit and wealth; So that in accounting terminology, disclosure is a comprehensive term that is also mentioned in the form of one of the four principles of accounting principles, which includes all information of financial importance (Hassani and Hosseini, 2010). In the accounting literature, several definitions of the nature of disclosure have been presented, the most important of which can be referred to the definitions of Hendriksen and Breda (1991), Riahi Belkaoui (2002), Maheshwari and Maheshwari (2000). Hendriksen and Breda (1991) argue that "disclosure in general means the reflection of information; But accountants take advantage of the more limited meaning of the term and consider it a reflection of financial information in the form of financial reports that are usually prepared annually". In another definition, Riahi Belkaoui (2002) considers disclosure as a useful domain of information for the useful use of information by users in decision making that leads to the optimal allocation of resources. According to Riahi Belkaoui (2002), full disclosure requires financial statements to be designed in such a way as to provide an accurate and clear picture of the nature of financial events that occur during a financial period. Maheshwari and Maheshwari (2000) also discussed disclosure as one of the accounting principles according to which financial statements should be presented in a complete and fair manner. The theory of conflict of interest, which is derived from the theory of representation, leads to the emergence of information asymmetry between the parties (Haghighat et al., 2016). Information asymmetry leads to a lack of understanding of outside people about the meaning and nature of managers' information, which deprives outside people of trust and confidence(Haghighat et al., 2016). Therefore, information disclosure is highlighted. Although Cerf (1961) first introduced disclosure indicators (Hu et al., 2021), the presentation of disclosure indicators is generally considered to be related to Botosan (1997). Botosan (1997) for the first time introduced disclosure indicators including background information, summary of historical results, key non-financial information, budget information, management issues and analysis.

According to accepted accounting principles, disclosure of information in the form of basic financial statements and explanatory notes is recognized as a fundamental principle. “According to Singhavi and Desai (1971), quality disclosure refers to the three components of completeness, accuracy and reliability of information” (Banimahd et al., 2017). According to Singhavi and Desai, (1971), large-scale quality disclosure is the provision of financial information, and partial quality disclosure is the provision of information outside the text of financial statements (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Based on what is stated in the theoretical foundations, it is a quality disclosure that is complete, accurate and reliable (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Disclosure of more information in the text of financial statements and explanatory notes is considered as quality disclosure, and the more financial and non-financial information a reporting unit discloses, the higher the quality level of disclosure (Banimahd et al., 2017). “Behavior is an institutional phenomenon that human beings engage in this activity in order to face and harmonize with the environment. Every behavior has a purpose, and without a purpose, the living behavior cannot be understood and analyzed” (Sohrabi and Alavi, 2010).

Naturally, capital holders make their decisions based on published reports from credible information sources. The information is expected to affect the behavior of shareholders, which can be seen in changes in the volume of shares of reporting firms, in other words, if the trading volume of reporting firms with good disclosure quality (DQ) fluctuates further, it is argued that the behavior of capital owners is affected by the DQ of those firms. According to the studies of Fama and French (1965), which were later addressed by Ball and Brown (2014), indirectly to the behavior and reaction of shareholders to financial information, the results of which can be expressed in changes in stock prices (Thomson, 2007). This is because of the information content in the financial statements Research by Restrepo et al. (2022) showed that the quality of disclosure has a positive effect on the value of the reporter unit. According to them, the criteria for selecting the text in the field of readability, tone of the text and similarity of the text affect the quality of disclosure. Ellili (2020) research shows that banks invest more in units that focus on the environment and provide quality financial reports, and this shows that banks' investment decisions are also focused on the social responsibility and quality of financial reporting of reporting units. Hu et al. (2021) in a study examined the effect of information DQ on the behavior of analysts in the Chinese stock market. The results of their research show that providing high quality financial information and reports increases the analysts' ability to predict. Thus, analysts' accuracy and optimism increase and lead to predictive focus. They also found that providing high quality information increased the credibility of reporter-specific information, which made it useful. The results of Muttakin et al. (2020) Showed that there is an inverse relationship between debt cost and the quality of financial reporting. Azadi et al. (2021) also found in another study that the readability of financial statements affects the behavior of shareholders and this can affect the liquidity of stocks. In a number of studies, there are similar findings that "low quality accounting may increase the cost of capital and thus lead to stock valuation errors". This means that the shareholder adjusts his behavior based on the quality of the reports. These results can be referred to the findings of Aboody et al. (2005) as well as Barth et al. (2013).

Despite the fact that accounting information has an information burden and with emphasis on the theory of capital market efficiency and the existence of competitive markets and also based on the findings of Zhu and Niu (2016) that accounting information is an important factor in stock prices (Zhu and Niu, 2016; Nikbakht et al., 2017), it can be argued that despite the efficient markets and competition among active stock exchange units to maximize the value of their units, managers' report quality information to provide good information nutrition to shareholders.

According to life cycle theory, reporting units in terms of life process have four stages of introduction, growth, maturity and decline. The basis of the reporting unit life cycle theory is that the change of reporting capacity of the reporter has a profound effect on investment decisions, financing methods and operational performance of the reporting unit (Aghaei et al., 2018). Life cycle theory states that reporting firms that are at the same stage in terms of life cycle have similar characteristics; in other words, firms that are at the same stage of the life cycle have similar cash flows, close financing costs, capital structure, and other similar characteristics. Therefore, it is expected that by placing the reporting unit in the second and third stages of the life cycle (i.e. growth and maturity), they have a good position compared to other reporting units in terms of value creation, cash flows, stock value increase and stock liquidity growth. The results of research Aghaei et al. (2018) showed that the risk of reporting units in the early stages of emergence and growth is higher than the stages of maturity and decline, and by stimulating the feelings of shareholders, the ability to take risks in the life cycle stages increases.

Fombrun and Rindova (1996) state that although the issue of reputation is a comprehensive issue, it remains an unknown element. They believe that ignorance and inability to define the concept of good reputation is due to the specialized nature of various topics and areas; as in any particular field, there is a different definition of reputation (Fombrun and Rindova, 1996). However, based on the concepts presented by the school of differentiation, good reputation can be defined as follows: The reputation of reporting firms is "overall evaluation of the company's stakeholders over time; This evaluation is formed from the direct experience of stakeholders, any communication or symbolization of the company that contains information about it and the comparison of this information with the performance of other competitors" (Najm Roshan et al., 2011). Therefore, the reputation of reporting firms is expected to be directly related to the life of reporting firms; because with the increase in the life of reporting firms, the opportunity of reporting firms to brand and gain popularity will also increase. Therefore, compared to two reporting firms that have different lifetimes, it is expected that a firm that has been operating for more years will have a better chance of gaining popularity. The results of Beckers et al. (2018) research show that reporting units that have a good reputation do not try to attract customers. This is while other reporting units are trying to attract the attention of customers. Because it affects the view of shareholders.

Material and Methods

Methodology

The present study is applied in terms of purpose and quasi-experimental post-event data collection method in the field of positive accounting research, which has been done using multivariate regression method and econometric models.

The statistical population of the present study consists of active units in the Tehran Stock Exchange. To homogenize the data, units were selected that have a continuous and active presence in the Tehran Stock Exchange at intervals of 2011 to 2018 and have the following conditions:

- Do not change fiscal year;
- Do not have a trading interval of more than three months;
- Have a fiscal year corresponding to end of December;
- The studied units are productive in terms of type of activity.

Given the explanations given and the information burden of financial reports published by the most important news source (i.e. audited financial statements published by the reporting unit), it is expected that this official source will directly influence the behavior. By influencing the decision, it will show its effect in changing the volume of exchanges. According to the theoretical foundations, hypotheses are as follows:

H (1): The quality of information disclosure has a direct effect on shareholder decisions. Also, since the life cycle of reporting firms indicates the operational characteristics of the reporting firms and considering that the firms that are in the stage of growth and maturity are at a dynamic level, so the second hypothesis of the research as follows:

H (2): Firms that are in the dynamic stage of production affect the quality of information disclosure in shareholder decisions. As mentioned earlier, as the life of reporting firms is expected to increase, the capacity of reporting firms to brand and gain popularity will also increase. Considering the placement of reporting firms in the maturity stage, the third hypothesis of the research as follows:

H (3): The good reputation of reporting firms affects the intensity of the quality of information disclosure in shareholder decision-making.

Data Analysis

The present study is applied in terms of purpose and in terms of method of data collection is a quasi-experimental post-event in the field of positive accounting research, which has been done using multivariate regression method and econometric models. The statistical population of the present study consists of active units in the Tehran Stock Exchange. How to operate the variables that require the volume of shares of reporting firms in two years after each fiscal year, has led to limitations in sample selection. To homogenize the data, firms were selected that have a continuous and active presence in the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2018 and have the following conditions (in alphabetical order):

- The selected firms do not have a change in fiscal year and their fiscal year during the research period is ending on March 20 of each year;
- Firms are productive in terms of type of activity;
- Firms have positive property rights;
- Firms have audited reports.

Based on this, out of 649 active firms in Tehran Stock Exchange, 124 firms have been selected, the screening table of which is shown in Table One.

Table 1. The Table of Sifter

Number of firms accepted until the end of March 2018		649
Deductible (Limitations):		
1. Firms that have been taken off the stock exchange	169	
2. Firms that have been admitted to the stock exchange during the years 1390 to 1395	93	
3. Firms whose field of activity is not productive	105	
4. Firms whose end of the fiscal year is inconsistent with March 20	62	
5. Firms that have had a quarterly trading break	34	
6. Firms for which the required information was not available	62	
Sum of restrictions		(525)
Statistical sample of the research		124

As can be seen in table 1, by applying the above conditions, 124 reporter firms were considered as a statistical sample. The required information of the stock exchange firms has been collected through Rahavard Novin database, the official website Tehran Stock Exchange. To conduct the present study, which seeks to examine the quality of disclosure on the behavior of shareholders according to the biological characteristics of reporting firms, to reject or confirm the research hypothesis, regression models have been used (equation 1).

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta 1DQ_{it} + \beta 2AGE_{it} + \beta 3SIZE_{it} + \beta 4AQ_{it} + \beta 5ERP_{it} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Where its factors are: The *SB* variable, which in this study is referred to as shareholder behavior. This variable is a dependent variable. Because the behavior in this study is affected under another reason. Arguing that the audited reports are finally published by 31 July each year; after the reports are published and the trades are opened, the effects of the published reports are expected to appear.

By disclosing quality, accurate and timely information, shareholders exchange shares of this type of reporting firms. Therefore, in order to study the behavior of shareholders, the natural logarithm of the average annual volume of the stock exchanges has been used. In other words, the annual sales volume of the audited reporter's shares belonging to period t can be measured for one year (*t+2*) from August 1 of the following year (*t+1*). According to this research, natural and legal persons who buy and sell stocks are among the shareholders. The *DQ* variable, which in this study is referred to as *DQ*. *DQ* in this study is an independent variable. Based on the existing literature the ranking of the Stock Exchange Organization has been used to measure the *DQ*; In this way that the quality points of the disclosure of the accepted firms for the periods of three, six, nine and twelve months are calculated and published by the Stock Exchange and Securities Organization. These scores reflect the assessment of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the level of awareness of reporting disclosure firms; the mentioned scores are calculated based on the weighted average of the criteria of timeliness and reliability of the disclosed information. Information assessed in accordance with the rules of information disclosure in the stock exchange organization (including annual financial statements, interim financial statements of three and six months (audited) and nine months and forecast earnings per share in periods of three, six, nine and is 12 months). Delays in sending information to the country's stock exchange and securities organization compared to the deadlines and the difference in realized profits compared to the forecasts are used to calculate the timeliness and reliability of the disclosure. Calculating the total rank for disclosing reporting firms requires weighting the features of timeliness and reliability of information (Kordestani and Hosseini, 2014).

The AGE variable represents the life cycle of the reporter firm. Life cycle reporting firm refer to what stage the reporting firm is in through the four stages of the life cycle. Based on the life cycle, there are four stages of introduction, growth, maturity and decline; also, based on the assumption of continuity of activity, although there is an end to the life of reporting firms, but its time is not known. Therefore, it is assumed that the firms are generally between the stages of growth and maturity; unless there is evidence that the reporting firms is in decline. Reporter firms' life cycle is one of the factors that can influence the decision of investors. Reasons such as the knowledge and reputation of the reporter firms, forecasting the profitability trend, relative certainty of not leaving the market, etc., are among the reasons that affect the life of the reporter firms and make shareholders have a more favorable view of older firms. In order to measure the life cycle of the reporter firms in this research, the calculation of the natural logarithm of the years of the reporter firms' activity in the stock exchange was used.

The *Size* variable indicates the size of the report firms. Based on the research literature, various principles have been introduced to measure the size of reporting firms. In the present study and based on the subject, according to the effect of sales volume on people's behavior, this criterion has been used to measure the size of the reporter firms. For this purpose, and to homogenize the data, the natural sales logarithm in equation 2 is used:

$$Size = Ln\ Sales \tag{2}$$

The *AQ* variable is a symbol of audit quality. To measure audit quality in the present study, following DeFund and Zhang (2014), we use the input criteria for measuring audit quality. To do this, we have used the size index of the auditing firm. This variable is considered an imaginary variable known as zeros and ones. If the stock reporter firm experiences its audit process by the auditing organization, it assigns number one; otherwise, it is zero. Because it is believed that if the audit process is performed by the audit organization, for reasons such as high work experience, high diversity of work, having the appropriate facilities, etc., the operations and results of the audit, have a higher quality than other audit firms (Banimahd et al., 2017).

The *ERP* variable indicates the good reputation of the reporter firm. In order to measure the good reputation of the reporting firm, the list of the top 50 stock exchange firms published by the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization is the criterion; thus, these 50 firms are considered as firms with high reputation and other firms as firms with low reputation. A virtual variable is used for this purpose; so that if the reporting firm is part of the list of the top 50 firms of the Tehran Stock Exchange (has a good reputation), it assigns number one and otherwise (not a good reputation), the number is zero (Hazrati et al., 2019). Variable ε also indicates the model error values. Indices *i* and *t* also refer to a specific reporting unit at a specified time.

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DQ_{it} \times AGE_{it} + \beta_2 DQ_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 SIZE_{it} + \beta_5 AQ_{it} + \beta_6 ERP_{it} + \varepsilon \tag{3}$$

Where in equation 3, *DQ×AGE* is an interactive variable to show the moderating role of the reporting firm life in relation to the quality of disclosure and shareholder behavior.

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DQ_{it} \times ERP_{it} + \beta_2 DQ_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 SIZE_{it} + \beta_5 AQ_{it} + \beta_6 ERP_{it} + \varepsilon \tag{4}$$

Where in equation 4, *DQ×ERP* is an interactive variable to show the moderating role of the reporting firm's reputation in relation to the quality of disclosure and shareholder behavior.

In order to review and analyze the initial data, the descriptive statistics of the research are shown in table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the research

Variable	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Sd.	Observations
Shareholder behavior	13.53	13.73	17.88	3.76	1.64	868
DQ	0.77	0.81	1	0.14	0.18	868
Reporter firm’s life	0.21	0	1	0	0.41	868
Reporter firm’s size	14.06	13.89	19.55	3.76	1.50	868
Audit quality	0.21	0	1	0	0.41	868
Good reputation of the reporter firm	0.18	0	1	0	0.39	868
Reporter firm age	16	45	1	15	8	124
Turnover	2725120	57986932	43	922591	6770839	124
Sales	5596334	309421381	43	1075916	20006706	124

As mentioned earlier, to test the hypotheses of the present study, the data of 124 reporting firms active in the stock exchange over a period of seven years (a total of 868 years - the company) was used. Standard deviation indicates that the data is centralized around the mean, which means that the data are close to the mean and have little scatter. The proximity of the mean and median of the data also shows the normality of the data distribution, which is true in the present study. According to the statistics of the average variable quality of disclosure, it can be concluded that the firms of the statistical community have obtained an average of 77% of the indicators of timeliness and reliability. The mean of the audit quality variable also shows that on mean 21% of the observed firms have been examined by the audit organization. Also, the mean of good reputation variable of the reporter firms indicates that 18% of the observations are among the 50 active firms of the Tehran Stock Exchange.

Testing the first hypothesis

Given that in regression estimation with combined data, different models can be used to estimate the coefficients of the model variables, it is necessary to determine the appropriate shape of the data before fitting the research model. As can be seen in Table 4, the statistics of both tests (Chow and Hausman) are significant at an error level of less than 5%; therefore, the data is of the panel type and should be estimated by the fixed effects method. The results of testing the first hypothesis are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Results of testing the first hypothesis based on panel data and fixed effects

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DQ_{it} + \beta_2 AGE_{it} + \beta_3 SIZE_{it} + \beta_4 AQ_{it} + \beta_5 ERP_{it} + \varepsilon$$

Variable	Coefficient	T value	Sig
Width of origin	6.4171	11.3025	0.0000
DQ	0.3912	4.2943	0.0000
Reporter firm's life	0.7515	5.4177	0.0000
Reporter firm's size	0.5834	18.3696	0.0000
Audit quality	0.2984	1.2749	0.2027
Good reputation of the reporter firm	0.6210	5.0448	0.0000
Chow Test	37.2121		0.0000
Hausman Test	39.3976		0.0000
Total significance of the model	122.7924		0.0000
Durbin-Watson		2.0981	
Determination coefficient		0.415974	
Adjusted coefficient of determination		0.412586	

In table 3, the Fisher statistic of Model 1 shows that the model is significant at the error level of less than 1%, and its adjusted coefficient of determination states that 41% of the changes in shareholder behavior are explained by the model's independent variables. The results of testing the first hypothesis of the research show that there is a positive and significant relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders. Also, the results of estimating equation 1 show that the behavior of shareholders has a positive and significant relationship with the size, age and reputation of the reporting firm; however, there is no significant relationship between shareholders' behavior and audit quality.

Testing the second hypothesis

As stated in the theoretical foundations and hypotheses of the research, in the second hypothesis, the adjusting role of the reporting firm age in the relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders is experimentally tested. For this purpose, the effect of the interactive variable of DQ and reporting firm age on shareholder behavior has been used. In testing this hypothesis, the statistics of both tests (Chow and Hausman) are significant at an error level of less than 5%; therefore, the data is of the panel type and should be estimated by the fixed effects method. The results of testing the second hypothesis are shown in table 4.

Table 4. Results of testing the second hypothesis based on panel data and fixed effects

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DQ_{it} *AGE_{it} + \beta_2 DQ_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 SIZE_{it} + \beta_5 AQ_{it} + \beta_6 ERP_{it} + \varepsilon$$

Variable	Coefficient	T value	Sig
Width of origin	5.6118	5.6851	0.0000
DQ × Reporter firm’s life	0.7599	5.4683	0.0000
DQ	0.7698	0.7021	0.0000
Reporter firm’s life	0.4101	14.2981	0.0000
Reporter firm’s size	0.584538	18.39375	0.0000
Audit quality	0.37248	0.9972	0.3189
Good reputation of the reporter firm	0.61404	4.98012	0.0000
Chow Test	32.9411		0.0000
Hausman Test	36.9802		0.0000
Total significance of the model	102.4921		0.0000
Durbin-Watson		2.1190	
Determination coefficient		0.416648	
Adjusted coefficient of determination		0.412583	

In Table 4, the Fisher statistic of equation 3 shows that the model is significant at the error level of less than 1%, and its adjusted coefficient of determination states that 41% of the changes in shareholder behavior are explained by the model's independent variables. Considering the coefficient and significance of the interactive variable life and the good reputation of the reporter firm, the results of testing the second hypothesis of the research show that the life of the reporter firm plays a positive adjusting role in the relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders.

Testing the third hypothesis

As stated in the theoretical foundations and hypotheses of the research, in the third hypothesis, the adjusting role of the reporting firm good reputation in the relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders is experimentally tested. For this purpose, the effect of the interactive variable of DQ and reporting firm good reputation on shareholder behavior has been used. In testing this hypothesis, the statistics of both tests (Chow and Hausman) are significant at an error level of less than 5%; therefore, the data is of the panel type and should be estimated by the fixed effects method. The results of testing the third hypothesis are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Results of testing the third hypothesis based on panel data and fixed effects

$$SB_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DQ_{it} * ERP_{it} + \beta_2 DQ_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 SIZE_{it} + \beta_5 AQ_{it} + \beta_6 ERP_{it} + \varepsilon$$

Variable	Coefficient	T-Value	Sig
Width of origin	6.4216	11.2833	0.0000
DQ × Reporter firm’s life	0.0744	13.0982	0.0000
DQ	0.5839	18.2092	0.0000
Reporter firm’s life	0.3912	4.2913	0.0000
Reporter firm’s size	0.3147	1.1856	0.2361
Audit quality	0.5650	1.2639	0.2066
Good reputation of the reporter firm	0.7525	5.4137	0.0000
Chow Test	27.4101		0.0000
Hausman Test	30.0891		0.0000
Total significance of the model	102.2131		0.0000
Durbin-Watson		2.0895	
Determination coefficient		0.415986	
Adjusted coefficient of determination		0.411916	

In table 5, the fisher statistic of equation 4 shows that the model is significant at the error level of less than 1%, and its adjusted coefficient of determination states that 41% of the changes in shareholder behavior are explained by the model's independent variables. Considering the coefficient and significance of the interactive variable DQ and the good reputation of the reporter firm, the results of testing the third hypothesis of the research show that the good reputation of the reporter firm not play a moderating role between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of financial information DQ on shareholder behavior with the moderating role of the reporting firm and its good reputation. Behavior is a reaction to an external action or action of a living thing. This behavior is more complex in humans than in other organisms due to the extensive mental processes within the human body. The behavior of shareholders in the capital market is no exception to this rule and their behavior is influenced by many factors, including financial and non-financial information of reporting firms. As argued in the theoretical foundations, one of these factors is the quality of the information disclosed by the reporting firms. The result of the first research hypothesis with the results of Hu et al. (2021), Azadi et al. (2021), Aghaei et al. (2018), informs that there is a positive relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders. This means that shareholders react positively to the increase in the quality of disclosed information, and one of the criteria for their investment is the quality of disclosed information. The results of the second and third hypotheses show that however, the good reputation of the reporter firm has no effect on the relationship between the quality of disclosure and the behavior of shareholders, the reporting firms' life variable plays a moderating role in the relationship between the quality of disclosure and shareholder behavior. In other words, the reporting firms' life variable intensifies the effect of DQ on shareholder behavior, and the reporting firm good reputation variable has no effect in this regard. These research results show that in line with the results of Beckers et al. (2018) and contrary to the findings of de-Matos and Rossi (2008), among the good reputation and there is no communication between the shareholders and the shareholders do not pay attention to the name of the reporting unit in their investment decisions. Research findings also show that shareholder behavior has a positive relationship with the size, life and reputation of the reporting firm. These findings generally indicate that firms with a history of high activity in the stock market and high annual sales, have a higher trading volume than new entrants and low sales, which of course can be seen in the analysis of the life cycle of the reporting firm. The results also indicate that there is no relationship between audit quality and shareholder behavior; perhaps the reason for this finding can be traced to the shareholders' lack of attention to the reporting firm auditor. According to the research findings, shareholders are advised to pay more attention to the quality of disclosure scores that are published regularly and quarterly through the official website Tehran Stock Exchange information system and to consider this criterion in their transactions. The Securities and Exchange Commission is also advised to be very careful in scoring and ranking the quality of reporting firms to disclose, in addition to assisting shareholders in decision-making, to encourage reporting firms to provide timely and quality information. Because quality information disclosure leads to better understanding and optimal allocation of resources.

According to the results of this study, for future research, it is suggested that the behavior of major and minor stakeholders be examined and analyzed separately for the quality of information disclosure and to determine which stakeholders are more sensitive to the quality of disclosure. In addition, in another study, with the help of psychology, the personality of shareholders can be considered as a fundamental factor in the behavior of shareholders.

In expressing the limitations of the present study, two points can be considered. First, with the introduction of the theory of public obedience to knowledgeable people and relying on the results of other research that shareholders do not have logical and rational decisions (Kordloui et al., 2015) and they do not show logical behavior, The effect of research variables on decision making, the results of which can be seen in the volume of transactions, has always been questioned; this is one of the challenges in the field of behavior. Also, as the second limitation of the present study, we can mention the small sample size, which can change the results of the research in a wide range. As future research, it is suggested that the impact of the quality of disclosure of audited and unaudited information on shareholder behavior be assessed.

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